The effects of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-through and welfare in an inflation targeting small open economy by Mukherjee, Sanchita
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effects of capital market openness on
exchange rate pass-through and welfare
in an inflation targeting small open
economy
Sanchita Mukherjee
University of California, Santa Cruz
12. April 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30478/
MPRA Paper No. 30478, posted 27. April 2011 16:34 UTC
The effects of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-through
and welfare in an inflation targeting small open economy ∗
Working Paper †
Sanchita Mukherjee ‡
April 2011
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-
through and subsequently on the social loss function in an inflation targeting small
open economy under a pure commitment policy. Applying the intuition behind the
macroeconomic trilemma, I examine whether a more open capital market in an infla-
tion targeting country improves the credibility of the central bank and consequently
reduces exchange rate pass-through. First, I empirically examine the effect of cap-
ital openness on exchange rate pass-through using a New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The empirical investigation reveals that limited capital openness leads to greater pass-
through from the exchange rate to domestic inflation, which raises the marginal cost of
deviation from the inflation target. This subsequently worsens the inflation output-gap
trade-off and increases the social loss of the inflation targeting central bank under pure
commitment. However, the calibration results suggest that the inflation output-gap
trade-off improves and the social loss decreases even in the presence of larger exchange
rate pass-through if the capital controls are effective at insulating the exchange rate
from interest rate and risk-premia shocks.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between optimal monetary policy and exchange rate pass-through (ERPT)
has gained significant attention in theoretical and empirical research over the last decade.
Much of the interest has been driven by the apparent decline in the pass-through of ex-
change rate changes to domestic prices in low inflation environments (McCarthy (2007),
Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), Bailliu and Fujii (2004)) over the last two decades. To date, the
literature on ERPT suggests that the risk to inflation of a depreciating domestic currency
depends on how much of the falling value of the currency is passed through to import
prices, and then to overall consumer prices. Taylor (2000) and Mishkin (2008) argue that
a monetary stance that is sufficiently reactive to inflation can insulate consumer prices
from the effects of a shock that causes the exchange rate to depreciate. They point out
that ERPT is primarily a function of the persistence of exchange rate and price shocks,
which tend to be reduced in an environment where inflation is low and monetary policy is
more credible. Further, some of the implications of incomplete ERPT on monetary pol-
icy associated with the local currency pricing (Devereux and Engel (2002), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003)), sticky import price behavior (Smets
and Wouters (2002)) and the deviation from the law of one price (Monacelli (2005)) have
already been analyzed.
One feature that characterizes all the models discussed above is the assumption of a
fully developed and perfectly open capital market. In Figure 1, I have plotted the average
capital market openness in nine inflation targeting developed countries, Australia, Canada,
Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and U.K. Here I have used a
capital openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (Chinn and Ito (2008)) as a measure
of capital market openness where the index ranges from (−1.83) to 2.50, and higher values
indicate a more financially open economy. Since the value 2.50 indicates a perfectly open
capital market, Figure 1 indicates that the assumption of a perfect capital mobility does
not hold for the developed IT countries.
Under flexible inflation targeting, the monetary authority adjusts the short-term nom-
inal interest rate to stabilize inflation to its target level and the real economy, represented
by the output-gap (Svensson (2000), Taylor (2001), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), Walsh
(2009)), and let the exchange rate float freely under the assumption of perfect capital mo-
bility. This is consistent with Mundell’s Macroeconomic Trilemma, which states that the
2
monetary authority can choose at most two of the following three conditions,
• Autonomous monetary policy in the sense of different domestic and foreign interest
rates
• A fixed exchange rate
• Perfect capital mobility
Chinn!Ito capital openness index
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Figure 1: Average capital openness in developed IT countries
Because the goal of central banks following a flexible inflation targeting regime is the stabi-
lization of domestic inflation and the output-gap, they need to be able to adjust domestic
interest rates independent of foreign interest rates. For this reason, central banks need
monetary independence. The developed IT countries gave up on a fixed exchange rate
regime after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. However, imposition of capital
controls indicate an inclination towards exchange rate management. When the countries
claim that they follow a flexible exchange rate system, but allow for limited capital open-
ness, it might have an adverse impact on the transparency of the monetary policy and
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central bank’s commitment to its policy target, which is inflation stabilization. This may
raise the inflationary expectations and have an impact on exchange rate pass-through.
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of capital openness on
exchange rate pass-through to domestic inflation in a flexible inflation targeting small open
economy and assess the welfare implications of incomplete ERPT. Accordingly, the purpose
of this paper is to answer the following questions:
• Does the pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic inflation vary with the
degree of capital openness?
• If there is any effect of the capital openness on exchange rate pass-through, what
implications does it have on inflation output-gap trade-off and the social loss function
in an inflation targeting small open economy?
This study is important because ERPT determines the impact of exchange rate move-
ments on the domestic rate of inflation and consequently, the degree to which exchange
rate fluctuations interfere with the main task of the central banks, inflation stabilization.
Moreover, over the years, emerging markets and developing countries have also begun to
adopt inflation targeting regime, and most of these countries do not have a perfectly open
capital market. A study estimating the welfare cost of the capital market imperfections
could be helpful to the potential inflation targeters for the insight it can bring through
their policy formulation.
To answer the aforementioned questions, I consider a typical small open economy,
which is following a flexible inflation targeting regime, in a New Keynesian set up. I use
the reduced form equations from Monacelli (2005), Walsh (2009) and Walsh (2010). I as-
sume that the central bank follows an inflation targeting regime by minimizing a standard
quadratic loss function subject to aggregate demand, aggregate supply and the interest
rate parity conditions under a pure commitment policy.1 The aggregate demand func-
tion or the forward looking (open economy) IS equation is derived from the consumption
Euler equation, taking into account that households consume both domestically produced
and imported goods. The aggregate supply curve or the forward looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve is obtained from the optimal price setting decisions of domestic producers.
Moreover, the exchange rate is introduced in terms of the uncovered interest rate parity
1The central bank that follows a flexible inflation targeting regime is committed to stabilize inflation
to its target level and the output-gap.
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(UIP) condition. Taking into consideration the deviations from purchasing power par-
ity,2 it is assumed that the real exchange rate can vary over time, and the exchange rate
pass-through is incomplete.
First I estimate the effect of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-through.
Then I impose parameter restrictions to the reduced form equations to examine how the
inflation and output-gap trade-off and the social loss vary with capital openness.
The calibration results suggest that in the presence of capital controls, the inflation and
output-gap trade-off deteriorates in the face of demand, cost-push and risk-premia shocks.
The deteriorating trade-off between inflation and the output-gap implies that the IT central
bank has to suffer a greater loss in terms of a reduction in real activity when inflation is
above its target rate. Since the primary objective of the IT central bank is to stabilize the
deviation of inflation from its target and the output-gap, imposition of capital controls is
welfare reducing. However, as the transmission of interest rate and risk-premia shocks to
exchange rate declines in the presence of capital controls, the inflation output-gap trade-off
and the social loss improves even in the presence of greater exchange rate pass-through.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the simple model of a small open
economy. Section 3 empirically examines the effect of capital openness on the pass-through
from the exchange rate to inflation and formulates the central bank’s problem. Section
4 presents the calibration results and the estimation of social loss under a commitment
strategy. Finally, section 5 describes the future research ideas and concludes.
2 Simple model of a small open economy
Here I use a simplified version of a small open economy model that is based on the reduced
form equations from Monacelli (2005), Walsh (2009) and Walsh (2010)3. This approach is
consistent with Walsh (1999).
The demand side of the economy is given by the following open economy forward looking
IS equation:
xt = −σrt + Etxt+1 + ηyet + ut, (2.1)
2See Rogoff (1996), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Engel (1993), Engel (1999), Engel (2002), Rogers
and Jenkins (1995)
3Walsh (2010) : Monetary Theory and Policy, 3rd ed. Chapter 9.
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where x is the output-gap, r is the real interest rate, e is the real exchange rate, Et denotes
the market expectations based on the information at time t, and u is a demand shock that
follows a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) given by
ut = ρu ut−1 + st,
where ρu > 0 and st ∼ iid (0, σ2s). In equation (2.1), the output-gap (xt) depends negatively
on the real interest rate, where the parameter σ (> 0) is the inverse of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Also, xt depends positively on the expected future output-gap 4 and
on real depreciation. Taking the domestic currency as the numeraire, the real exchange
rate is defined as the relative price of the foreign currency where an increase in e is given
by a real depreciation of the domestic currency. Moreover, following the empirical evidence
that purchasing power parity need not hold, this model assumes that the real exchange
rate can vary. With a real depreciation, domestic products become cheaper relative to
foreign products. Therefore, exports increase and imports fall, giving a boost to aggregate
demand and output, and therefore, ηy > 0.
The supply side of the economy is given by the New Keynesian open economy Phillips
curve (NKPC),
pit = piT + βEt(pit+1 − piT ) + λxt + ηpiet + t, (2.2)
where pi is CPI (consumer price index) inflation, and piT is the inflation target set by the
central bank, and t is a supply shock following a first order autoregressive (AR) process
given by
t = ρ t−1 + ωt,
where ρ > 0 and ωt ∼ iid (0, σ2ω). In a sticky price model, the pricing decision of firms
depends positively on real marginal costs, and therefore, the output-gap (=⇒ λ > 0) and
the expected future inflation (=⇒ β > 0). Also, the deviation of inflation from its target
level depends on the exchange rate depreciation, as the falling value of the currency puts
upward pressure on import prices, and then is passed through to overall consumer prices
(=⇒ ηpi > 0).5
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, perfect capital substitutability and
4Indicating that current aggregate demand is a function of expected future income.
5Also known as exchange rate pass-through.
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risk neutrality, the uncovered interest rate parity holds and is given by 6
Etet+1 − et = rt − rt∗,
where r is the domestic real interest rate, r∗ is the foreign real interest rate, and (Etet+1−et)
is the expected real rate of depreciation. Interest rate parity suggests that the home interest
rate on bonds, r, must equal the foreign interest rate r∗, plus the expected real depreciation,
(Etet+1 − et). In other words, if home and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, and the
international capital is fully mobile, the two bonds pay different interest rates only if agents
expect that there will be a compensating movement in the exchange rate. However, the
empirical evidence in favor of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is very weak. Therefore, I
relax the assumption of risk neutral agents and introduce a shock reflecting a risk-premium
demanded by risk averse investors for foreign bonds.7 Thus, the UIP condition is given by
Etet+1 − et = rt − rt∗ − ζt, (2.3)
where ζt is an AR(1) risk-premium shock. 8
Since it is assumed that the country is small in world capital markets, it takes the
foreign real interest rate, r∗, as given. Also, the real interest rate is defined as 9
rt = it − Et(pit+1 − piT )
where i is the nominal interest rate (the central bank’s policy instrument). All the variables,
except inflation, are expressed in terms of their deviation from the respective steady state
values where the steady state inflation is assumed to be piT . 10
Subsequently, following the standard literature, it is assumed that the monetary au-
thority minimizes a quadratic loss function, which depends on the variability of inflation
from its target and the output-gap,11 subject to equations (2.1) through (2.3). Thus, the
6Assuming that the forward rate (Ft,t+1) is equal to the future spot rate (E
e
t+1).
7The assumption of perfect capital mobility still holds.
8ζt = ρζ ζt−1 + φ′t where ρζ > 0 and φ
′
t ∼ iid (0, σ2φ′).
9From the Fisher’s condition, the real interest rate (rt) can be written as, rt = it − Etpit+1. Also, the
steady state real interest rate can be written as rss = (rss + piT )− piT , where (rss + piT ) = iss. Therefore,
rt − rss = (it −Etpit+1)− (iss − piT ), which can be also written as rt − rss = (it − iss)− (Etpit+1 − piT ). If
we assume that rss = iss = 0, then rt = it − (Etpit+1 − piT ).
10The steady state values for the rest of the variables are assumed to be zero.
11Under the assumption of flexible inflation targeting, the natural rate of output is assumed to be the
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loss function (L) is the following:
L =
1
2
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi
[
αx2t+i + (pit+i − piT )
2
]}
. (2.4)
3 Effect of capital openness on exchange rate pass-through
and the UIP condition
3.1 Capital market openness and exchange rate pass-through
In this section, I empirically examine the effect of capital openness on ERPT, and to do
that I use equation (2.2), the reduced form equation of the forward looking aggregate
supply curve from section 2. However, in order to empirically examine this effect in the
inflation targeting countries, I modify the aggregate supply curve. Instead of assuming a
zero steady state for the real exchange rate, the real rate of depreciation is defined in the
following way
∆et = ∆st + pi∗t − pit,
where ∆s is the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its trend level,12 pi∗ is the
world CPI inflation rate, and pi is the domestic CPI inflation rate.
I include several control variables that have been found to be important determinants
of inflation in the literature such as the output-gap (log difference between actual and
trend 13 real GDP), and trade openness. In New Keynesian literature, a higher output-gap
reflects higher cost of production (higher marginal cost), which in turn leads to increase
in the prices, and as a result higher inflation. Moreover, Romer (1993) demonstrates that
countries with greater trade openness experience lower average rates of inflation. He ex-
plains that an unanticipated monetary expansion causes exchange rate depreciation, and
as this depreciation is greater in more open economies, the benefits of a surprise expansion
are a decreasing function of the degree of trade openness. Therefore, the monetary author-
implicit target for the actual output.
12In a flexible inflation targeting environment, assuming that the trend exchange rate is the implicit
target of the actual exchange rate. Also, measuring the exchange rate deviation from its trend level will
remove the non-stationarity in the exchange rate.
13HP filtered trend where the smoothing parameter is 1600.
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ities in a more open economy expand less and achieve lower average rates of inflation.14
Since I use an interaction term between exchange rate deviation and capital openness in
the regression equation, I also control for capital openness (ko) in order to avoid omitted
variable bias. Therefore, the estimating equation is the following:
(pij,t − piT ) = αj + β (Etpij,t+1 − piT ) + λxj,t + ηpi ∆ej,t + ηpiko (∆ej,t ∗ koj,t)
+ηko koj,t + ηto toj,t + ′j,t,
(3.1)
where j refers to the country, t refers to the time period, pi is the rate of inflation, x is the
output-gap, ∆e is the real exchange rate depreciation, Et denotes the market expectations
based on information available at time t, ko is a measure of capital openness, to is a measure
of trade openness, and ′it is a supply shock. The CPI inflation target is assumed to be
fixed at 2.5%, since the developed inflation targeting countries have a constant inflation
target between 2-3%. Thus, I examine whether the ERPT in 8 IT developed countries,15
Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK, has
declined with a more open capital account.16 The date of the adoption of IT for each
country is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Countries in study
Country Time of Adoption of IT
1. Australia 1993Q2
2. Canada 1991Q1
3. Iceland 2001Q1
4. New Zealand 1989Q4
5. Norway 2001Q1
6. Sweden 1993Q1
7. Switzerland 2000Q1
8. UK 1992Q4
14Monetary expansion is an important determinant of inflation in the long run.
15Countries that have adopted IT until 2008 (central banks’ websites).
16Israel is not included due to some data unavailability.
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3.1.1 Data description
The macroeconomic data set used in this estimation is taken from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The data set for each country begins when it started
targeting inflation and extends through 2008Q4, and the frequency of the data is quarterly.
The world CPI inflation data is taken from the IMF’s IFS database. Inflation deviation
data is constructed by subtracting the monetary authority’s target inflation rate (2.5%)
from actual inflation. Since, for most of the countries in the sample, data for their inflation
forecasts is not available, I use the average value of current and last period’s inflation
as a proxy for one period ahead expected inflation. The output-gap is constructed by
subtracting the real GDP trend (using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter
1600)) from actual real GDP for each country. The nominal exchange rate deviation is
measured by the log difference of the nominal exchange rate with respect to US dollars
from a smoothed series, which is constructed using Hodrick- Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600. Moreover, the degree of trade openness is calculated as the share of
(imports+ exports) in GDP .
The Chinn-Ito (2008) index is used as the measure of capital account openness. This
index is based on the binary variables, which capture the presence of cross-border financial
restrictions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. Chinn and Ito compile the index by considering four major categories of re-
strictions on external accounts: (i) the presence of a multiple exchange rate regime, (ii) the
presence of restrictions on current account transactions, (iii) the presence of restrictions
on capital account transactions, and (iv) the presence of a requirement of the surrender of
export proceeds. Since these categories reflect capital controls instead of capital openness,
they take the inverse of the values of the binary variables, and construct an index based on
the standardized principal components. The index ranges from (−1.83) to 2.50,17 where
higher values indicate a more financially open economy. By the nature of its construction,
this is a de-jure measure of financial openness, as it attempts to measure the regulatory
restrictions on capital account transactions. Since I am interested in finding out the sig-
naling and disciplinary effect of capital account openness on ERPT, the use of a de-jure
measure is appropriate. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables.
17For the 8 IT developed countries, it ranges from -1.13 through 2.50.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(pit − piT ) 440 0.024 0.018 −0.014 0.171
(Etpit+1 − piT ) 440 0.024 0.014 −0.0019 0.111
xt 431 8.12e-08 0.024 −0.09 0.083
et 440 0.049 0.099 −0.188 0.333
ko 440 2.22 0.585 −1.13 2.50
to 410 1.93 0.245 1.24 3.07
3.2 Stationarity test results
Before estimating equation (3.1), I test for non-stationarity of the variables applying Aug-
mented Dickey Fuller test with a lag term, where the optimal lag length for each variable
was selected using the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The null hypothesis (H0) for the stationar-
ity test results is that the variable is non-stationary (has a unit root), and the alternative
hypothesis (HA) suggests that the variable is stationary (with no unit root). The ADF
test results are summarized in Table 3 and reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all
of the variables, suggesting that they are all stationary.
Table 3: Stationarity test results
Variable Symbol ADF test statistic (No. of lags)
Inflation deviation (pit − piT ) −4.075∗∗∗(2)
Output-gap xt −9.365∗∗∗(8)
Exchange rate deviation ∆et −4.628∗∗∗(1)
Capital market openness kot −2.970∗∗(4)
Trade openness tot −4.965∗∗∗(1)
(*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level)
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3.2.1 Estimation technique
To estimate exchange rate pass-through in the 8 IT countries either one of the two types of
estimation techniques can be used, the time series estimation technique separately for the
8 countries, or a panel regression. The time series analysis suffers from a limitation in this
case. Since the study focuses on the period in which these countries have followed inflation
targeting, its duration is not very long. As a result, there are only a small number of ob-
servations for each country, which may give biased estimates. However, this shortcoming
can be addressed with a panel regression. The greater number of observations in a panel
study will give more precise estimates. Also because this study focuses on inflation target-
ing developed countries rather than a random sample of a very large number of countries,
the coefficients are expected to be similar. Moreover, the use of a panel regression will
allow for the identification of country-specific effects in the estimation of the cross-country
pass-through equation. However, here two aspects need to be addressed. First, in this
model, the problem of endogeneity can be expected to arise as the exchange rate and the
output-gap are affected by the deviation of current inflation from its target. This endo-
geneity makes the estimation using pooled ordinary least squares inconsistent. Second,
the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity suggests that the error term is heteroskedas-
tic18 rendering the fixed effects estimates inconsistent. The problem of endogeneity can be
addressed by using the lagged values of output, inflation and exchange rate deviations as
instruments. However, in this particular case, the number of instrumental variables and
hence the orthogonality conditions will exceed the number of regressors, which will lead to
over-identification. Hansen (1982), in his seminal work, introduced the generalized meth-
ods of moments (GMM) estimation. One important feature of the generalized methods of
moments (GMM) is that it allows for more moment conditions than the number of param-
eters that need to be estimated, which means it allows the parameters to be over-identified
and can obtain an optimal weighting matrix. Therefore, to overcome the problem of endo-
geneity and heteroskedasticity, I use the IV-GMM (Instrumental variable general method of
moments) estimation technique that generates coefficient estimates robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. Further, I test the validity of the instruments applying Hansen
J test.
18Breusch-Pagan test statistic, a lagrange multiplier (LM) measure, is distributed Chi-squared(p) under
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. For the aggregate supply function, the Breusch-Pagan LM statistic:
127.18, with Chi-sq P-value 2.4e-24. This test statistic suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity in favor of the alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity.
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3.2.2 Empirical results
In this section, I present the results from estimating the aggregate supply function us-
ing pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects and IV-GMM. They capture how
the cross-country ERPT changes depending on the openness of the capital market. The
coefficients from pooled OLS and fixed effects suffer from endogeneity and heteroskedas-
ticity bias. The coefficient estimates from panel IV-GMM estimation are efficient as the
estimates are robust to endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. To address
the endogeneity problem, I have used lagged values of the endogenous variables as instru-
ments. To examine the validity of the instrument set, I apply Hansen’s J test, where the
null hypothesis is that the instruments as a group are exogenous. The p-value of Hansen J
statistic (0.77) fails to reject the null hypothesis, implying that the instruments are valid.
The estimating equation is the following:
(pij,t − piT ) = αj + β (Etpij,t+1 − piT ) + λxj,t + ηpi ∆ej,t + ηpiko (∆ej,t ∗ koj,t)
+ηko koj,t + ηto toj,t + ′j,t,
(3.2)
Table 4 presents the estimation results. I have reported the coefficient estimates from
pooled OLS in column 1, fixed effects in column 2, and IV-GMM in column 3.19
The results from the panel estimation suggest that higher expected inflation puts up-
ward pressure on current inflation, as indicated by a value for β that is significantly different
from zero and positive. In optimal monetary policy analysis, the coefficient attached to
expected future inflation, β is assumed to be greater than 0.9 in equation (3.2). However,
the empirical analysis suggests that it is close to 0.6. This could be due to the fact that the
average value of last period’s inflation and current inflation is used as a proxy for expected
future inflation, Etpit+1, since the data for the forecast inflation is not available. Further,
a higher marginal cost of production (reflected in the output-gap) also increases inflation,
λ > 0 and statistcially significant. On the other hand, higher capital mobility significantly
reduces inflation as ηko < 0.
The effect of real depreciation on inflation or ERPT is determined by the coefficient
(ηpi + ηpiko ∗ ko). Real depreciation puts upward pressure on inflation, as ηpi > 0. However,
the positive effect of real depreciation on inflation declines significantly with greater capital
19Robust standard errors in parenthesis (*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *
significant at 10% level)
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Table 4: Effect of capital openness on ERPT
Coefficient Pooled OLS Fixed Effects IV-GMM
(I) (II) (III)
β 0.549∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.058) (0.069)
λ 0.003 0.002 0.134∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.060)
ηpi 0.066∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.101)
ηpiko −0.032∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.036)
ηko −0.003∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ηto −0.012∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 407 407 392
No. of Countries 8 8 8
R2 0.54 0.52 0.50
p value for Hansen J statistic 0.77
openness, as the coefficient on (∆ej,t ∗ koj,t), ηpiko, is significantly less than zero.
Since the capital openness index is variable over time, the effect of capital openness
on ERPT is shown in Figure 2 along with the Chinn-Ito capital openness index. The
solid line in the middle shows the effect of capital openness on ERPT (ηpi + ηpiko ∗ ko), and
the two lines on either side of the solid line show the 95% confidence interval. The 95%
confidence interval around the solid line allows us to determine the conditions under which
capital openness has a statistically significant effect on ERPT. When the capital market is
completely closed (that is ko = 0), 1% real depreciation raises inflation by 0.23%. However,
as the capital market opens up gradually, the effect of real depreciation on inflation (ERPT)
declines significantly. Figure 2 suggests that ERPT in IT countries remains significantly
positive, but declines as capital market openness increases. Further, as the capital market
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Figure 2: The effect of capital openness on the exchange rate pass-through
openness is large enough (rises above 2.06), the pass-through becomes insignificant.
To explain the decline in ERPT in a low inflation environment, Taylor (2000) has argued
that in the presence of staggered price setting, in which pricing decisions are optimally made
in a monopolistically competitive environment, the pricing power and the persistence of
costs are directly related. Therefore, low inflation may be associated with less persistent
changes in costs, and lower persistence of costs will result in smaller pass-through. In
line with Taylor’s argument, the Bank of Canada reports that when inflation is low, and
the central bank’s commitment to keeping it low is highly credible, firms are less inclined
to quickly pass higher costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices, which in turn
generates a low ERPT (Bank of Canada (2000)). In this paper, the decline in ERPT in the
presence of perfect capital mobility can be due to the fact that for an inflation targeting
country that claims to have a flexible exchange rate, an open capital market makes the
commitment to a nominal anchor (inflation for IT countries) stronger and indicates a more
15
stable monetary policy. This in turn leads to a low inflation environment and incomplete
ERPT.
Moreover, although (Terra (1998)) points out that the negative relationship between
trade openness and inflation is generated mainly for severely indebted countries, I find
a significantly negative relationship between trade openness and inflation for developed
countries, confirming Romer’s (1993) prediction that monetary authorities in more open
economies expand less, as the harm of a real depreciation is greater in those countries, and
they experience lower average rates of inflation as a result.
3.3 Capital market imperfections and the interest rate parity condition
In the presence of capital controls, interest parity does not hold anymore. Aliber (1973)
explains the departure from interest rate parity in terms of the rise in risk-premia in the
presence of capital controls due to the exchange risk and the political risk. Dooley and Isard
(1980) provide empirical evidence for this claim using the DM/dollar rate.20 Aliber (1973)
argues that capital controls can be imposed by offering less stringent terms on the forward
contract relative to the spot contract. This type of control can generate exchange risk
because speculators can buy an unlimited volume of the forward contract, but they cannot
do the same for the spot market. Also, Aliber (1973) points out that a political risk may
arise from differences in political jurisdiction, which can be explained by the probability
that the authority might apply capital controls.21 Moreover, in the presence of capital
controls, a shock to the domestic interest rate will not be fully transmitted to exchange
rate deviations.22 Therefore, with limited capital openness the UIP is the following:
γ (Etet+1 − et) = rt − rt∗ − ζ ′t, (3.3)
where ζ ′t is the AR(1) risk-premium shock23 and γ > 1.
20These risk-premia apply in addition to the risk-premium charged by risk averse domestic agents on
the foreign bonds.
21In this case, following Aliber (1973), and Dooley and Isard (1980), an effect on the level of risk-premia
is considered and not on its volatility.
22Considering that the capital controls would be imposed to insulate exchange rate fluctuation from the
interest rate shocks.
23ζ′t = ρζ′ ζ
′
t−1 + φ
′
t where ρζ > 0 and φ
′
t ∼ iid (0, σ2φ′).
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3.4 The central bank’s problem
The problem of the central bank can be written as:
Max. L = −12
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi
[
αx2t+i + (pit+i − piT )
2
]}
(3.4)
Subject to, xt = −σ(it − (Etpit+1 − piT )) + Etxt+1 + ηyet + ut (3.5)
(pit − piT ) = β(Etpit+1 − piT ) + λxt + ηpi ′et + t (3.6)
γ (Et et+1 − et) = (it − Et(pit+1 − piT ))− (i∗t − (Etpit+1 − piT )∗)− ζ ′t (3.7)
where ηpi ′ > ηpi, γ > 1, and ζ ′t denotes the exchange plus political risk-premia shocks
following an AR(1) process:
ζ ′t = ρζ′ ζ
′
t−1 + φ
′
t,
where ρζ′ > 0, and φ′t ∼ iid (0, σ2φ′). The Lagrangian is of the following form: 24
` = −1
2
[
αxt
2 + (pit − piT )2
]
+ ψ1[xt + σ(it − Etpit+1)− Etxt+1 − ηyet − ut]
+ψ2[(pit − piT )− βEt(pit+1 − piT )− λxt − ηpiet − t]
+ψ3[Etet+1 − (it − Et(pit+1 − piT )) + (i∗t − (Etpit+1 − piT )
∗
) + ζ ′t]
+Et
{ ∞∑
i=1
βi
[
−1
2
(
αx2t+i + (pit+i − piT )
2
)]}
+ψ1t+i[xt+i + σ(it+i − Etpit+1+i)− Etxt+1+i − ηyet+i − ut+i]
+ψ2t+i[(pit+i − piT )− βEt(pit+1+i − piT )− λxt+i − ηpiet+i − t+i]
+ψ3t+i[γEtet+1+i − γet+i − (it+i − Et(pit+1+i − piT ))− (i∗t+i − (Etpit+i+1 − piT )
∗
) + ζ ′t+i]
(3.8)
Also, we have the demand shock, the cost-push shock and the risk-premia shocks following
the respective AR(1) processes with independent innovations:
ut+1 = ρu ut + st+1 (3.9)
t+1 = ρ t + ωt+1 (3.10)
ζt+1 = ρζ ζt + φt+1 (3.11)
24Minimization of the loss function can be written as the negative of the maximization of the loss
function.
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For simplicity, assuming the foreign interest rate, i∗t , and the deviation of foreign expected
inflation from its target (Etpit+1 − piT )∗) are equal to zero, the shock processes ((3.9)-(3.11))
and the first-order conditions from the Lagrangian (3.8) can be written in the following
state-space form:
CEt

ut+1
t+1
ζt+1
xt+1
Et(pit+1 − piT )
et+1

= D

ut
t
ζt
xt
(pit − piT )
et

+

0
0
0
σ
0
1

it +

σs 0 0
0 σω 0
0 0 σφ
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

 st+1ωt+1
φt+1

where
C =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 σ 0
0 0 0 0 β 0
0 0 0 0 1 γ

;
D =

ρu 0 0 0 0 0
0 ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρζ 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 −ηy
0 −1 0 −λ 1 −ηpi
0 0 −1 0 0 γ

.
Premultiplying the system with the inverse of C we can write the system in the following
way,
EtZt+1 = KZt +Git + χt+1. (3.12)
Moreover, i is the policy instrument to minimize the objective function that can be ex-
pressed as
L = Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βiZ ′t+iQZt+i
}
, (3.13)
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where Q depends on the specification of a single-period loss function under commitment,
and Q can be written as the following:
Q =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 α 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

.
Following numerical methods developed by Soderlind (1999), the endogenous variables, xt,
(pit − piT ) and et are obtained in terms of the shocks (ut, t, ζt). Moreover, the social loss
is calculated from equation (3.13).
4 Welfare implications of capital market imperfections un-
der commitment
In this section, I present some quantitative results based on a calibrated version of the small
open economy. The unknown parameters in the model are β, α, σ, λ,, ηy, ηpi, ηpi ′ and γ.
The parameter values are standard and most of them are taken from Gali and Monacelli
(2005).25 The discount factor β = 0.99, implying a steady state interest rate of i = 0.01
at a quarterly rate.26 The weight on the output-gap in the central bank’s loss function
(α) is set at 0.25. Parameter σ, which is the inverse of the coefficient of risk aversion, is
assumed to be 1. Parameter λ, which captures the effect of the output-gap on inflation, is
set at 0.05. ηy is calculated using the values of structural parameters from the small open
economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2005), where ηy = 0.4. It is assumed that the pass-
through parameter ηpi varies between 0 (no pass-through) and 1 (complete pass-through)
where the value of ηpi rises with capital market imperfections. The coefficient attached to
expected real depreciation, γ, in the UIP condition is set equal to one in the presence of
perfect capital mobility such that the UIP represents the typical UIP condition for a small
open economy. However, in the presence of limited capital openness γ > 1 and it is set
at 1.5, implying that when capital controls are in place and effective, interest rate changes
25The model is calibrated on a quarterly basis.
26The interest rate is 4%per annum.
19
will not be transmitted entirely to the exchange rate.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the response of an inflation deviation (pit − piT ), the output-
gap (xt) and the real exchange rate (et) to a positive and temporary (ρu = 0) aggregate
demand shock, a cost-push shock (ρ = 0) and risk-premia shocks (ρζ = 0). Following the
empirical evidence in section 3.1, the pass-through coefficient (ηpi) rises with capital market
imperfections, and here I have plotted the impulse responses for ηpi = 0.2 and ηpi = 0.4.
Further, to assess the effect of γ on the impulse response functions, I compare two cases,
γ = 1 and γ = 1.5 where ηpi is set at 0.4.
Figure 3 shows the responses of an inflation deviation (pit − piT ), the output-gap (xt)
and the real exchange rate (et) to a temporary (ρu = 0) aggregate demand shock. The
positive demand shock increases the output-gap and requires monetary tightening. The
rise in the interest rate causes the exchange rate to appreciate making imports cheaper,
and as a result, inflation declines below its target level. However, clearly the deflation
required to bring output back to its trend level rises with capital market imperfections.
One interesting aspect of the impulse response function is that although the demand shock
is temporary, the figure shows a strong positive correlation in the output-gap over time
under commitment.
Figure 4 displays the impact of a temporary cost-push shock on (pit − piT ), xt and et.
In response to a positive cost-push shock, the production cost increases, and as a result,
inflation rises above its target. The central bank finds it optimal to engineer a temporary
reduction in the output-gap, thus dampening the effect of the shock on inflation. Also,
due to the rise in domestic prices, the real exchange rate appreciates. To stabilize prices,
the central bank raises the interest rate, and the rise in the interest rate is greater in the
presence of greater capital openness (smaller pass-through). One interpretation for this
could be that under an inflation targeting framework, greater capital openness makes the
central bank’s commitment to stabilizing inflation more credible. This in turn leads to a
greater response of the nominal interest rate in the face of a cost-push shock. Moreover,
it is evident from Figure 4 that the output loss required to bring inflation to its target is
greater in the presence of capital market imperfections, suggesting a deterioration in the
inflation output-gap trade-off in the presence of capital market imperfections.
Figure 5 presents the effect of positive and temporary risk-premia shocks on (pit− piT ),
xt and et. Positive risk-premia shocks cause the exchange rate to depreciate, and therefore
raise inflation. The pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation is more complete with
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limited capital openness, and consequently, the rise in inflation is greater when ηpi = 0.4,
compared to when ηpi = 0.2. In response to a real depreciation, the central bank raises the
interest rate. However, limited capital openness leads to a greater interest rate response
to positive risk-premia shocks. This could be due to the fact that in the presence of
capital market imperfections, the pass-through rate is greater, which raises inflation more
when there is a depreciation resulting from a positive risk-premium shock. As a result,
the monetary authority raises the interest rate more to influence the exchange rate. The
behavior of macroeconomic variables in response to the risk-premia shocks in turn indicates
that in an inflation targeting environment, the central bank has less control over exchange
rates in the presence of greater capital openness. Further, in the face of risk-premia shocks,
greater output loss is needed to reduce inflation to its target level in the presence of capital
controls.
Further, I plot the impulse response functions of (pit−piT ), xt and et for γ > 1, keeping
ηpi = 0.4 and compare these to those when γ = 1, in response to demand, cost-push and
risk-premia shocks, respectively. Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 show that in response
to demand, cost-push and risk-premia shocks, the reaction of the exchange rate (blue line)
under limited capital openness (ηpi = 0.2) is less when γ > 1 (more specifically γ = 1.5).
This reduced reaction of the real exchange rate to macroeconomic shocks improves the
inflation output-gap trade-off and reduces social loss.
The social loss calculated from equation (3.13) (for different values of ηpi and γ) is
summarized in Table 5. The top two rows in Table 5 describe the parameter values of β,
σ, ηy, α and λ and the persistence parameters ρu, ρ and ρζ . The first column presents
the values of ηpi, which vary from 0.00 (no pass-through) to 1.00 (complete pass-through).
The second and third columns denote the coefficient γ, which is attached to the exchange
rate deviation in the UIP condition. First, γ is set to 1 and then to 1.5, indicating that
the variation in the interest rate is first transmitted entirely and then only partially to
exchange rate deviations. The conjecture is that in the presence of perfect capital mobility
there is a one-to-one relation between exchange rate deviation and the interest rate through
the UIP condition, and therefore, γ = 1. However, when capital controls are effectively in
place, they would insulate the exchange rate deviations from the interest rate fluctuations,
and consequently γ > 1. Fourth and fifth columns present the values of the central bank’s
loss function for corresponding values of ηpi and γ.
The values of the parameters and the central bank’s loss function in Table 4 suggest that
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Table 5: Calibrated parameter values and social loss
β = 0.99 σ = 1 ηy = 0.4 α = 0.25 λ = 0.05
ρu = 0.0 ρ = 0.0 ρζ = 0.0
ηpi γ γ ′ Loss(L) Loss ′(L ′)
γ = 1 γ ′ = 1.5
0.00 1 1.5 39.38 39.38
0.20 1 1.5 73.09 64.42
0.40 1 1.5 102.33 87.18
0.60 1 1.5 121.43 103.62
0.80 1 1.5 134.79 116.00
0.90 1 1.5 140.13 121.20
1.00 1 1.5 144.81 125.91
as the ERPT rises with capital market imperfections, keeping everything else unchanged,
social loss rises under commitment, implying that a greater pass-through is welfare reducing
under a commitment strategy. However, as the value of γ is set to greater than one in the
presence of limited capital openness, the social loss rises with greater pass-through, but
is less than in previous respective cases, when γ was kept constant at one. For example,
when γ = 1, a 20% rise in the pass-through (as ηpi rises from 0.00 to 0.20), raises the
social loss by 85% (from 39.38 to 73.09). However, when the capital controls effectively
insulate the exchange rate from external shocks that is when γ = 1.5 > 1, a 20% rise in the
pass-through raises social loss by 63% (from 39.38 to 64.42). Thus, when capital controls
are in place and effective in the sense that they can insulate the exchange rate from the
fluctuations in interest rates, then even in the presence of large exchange rate pass-through,
social loss can be reduced.
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5 Conclusions and future research
To the best of my knowledge, the existing literature has analyzed imperfect exchange rate
pass-through under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. In this paper, I estimate
the effect of limited capital openness on exchange-rate pass-through, and further analyze
the inflation output-gap trade-off and the social loss function of a central bank following
an inflation targeting regime under a commitment strategy. The approach used in the
theoretical part of the paper is consistent with Walsh (1999) and Adolfson (2007), although
they do not incorporate capital market imperfections in their respective models.
Using a forward looking New Keynesian model, I find that in the presence of imperfect
capital mobility, the exchange rate pass-through to inflation increases and the uncovered
interest parity condition does not hold. Under reasonable parameter values drawn from
the recent literature, the calibration results show that with limited capital openness, these
two effects raise the marginal cost of an inflation deviation from its target, and lead to
a deterioration of the inflation output-gap trade-off in the face of demand, cost-push and
risk-premia shocks. Also, with limited capital openness, the nominal interest rate response
to positive demand (increases the output-gap) and cost-push shocks (raises inflation above
its target) are less, while the response to the risk-premia shocks (cause exchange rate depre-
ciation) are greater in magnitude. Further, the social loss under an optimal commitment
policy rises with greater exchange rate pass-through. However, the social loss can be re-
duced by insulating the exchange rate deviations from the transmission of interest rate
shocks.
The implication of these findings is that under an optimal commitment strategy, an
inflation targeting country has to suffer greater loss in terms of real activity to keep inflation
at its target in the presence of capital controls, and thus imposing capital controls when the
country is targeting inflation is welfare reducing. For example, when an inflation targeting
economy experiences a positive risk-premium shock, the exchange rate depreciates. Due
to a greater pass-through from exchange rates to inflation in the presence of an imperfect
capital market, inflation rises more. Consequently, the central bank suffers from a larger
output loss to bring the inflation back to its target. As a result, the social loss in the
presence of capital market restrictions rises. However, if the capital controls are effective
at reducing the transmission of interest rate and risk-premia shocks to the real exchange
rate, then the social loss can be reduced even in the presence of greater exchange rate pass-
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through. Also, under an inflation targeting framework, limited capital openness makes the
central bank’s commitment of inflation stabilization less credible and reduces the interest
rate response in the face of cost-push shocks. At the same time, greater capital mobility
(limited capital mobility) leads to a lower (greater) response of the interest rate to risk-
premia shocks that directly affect the exchange rate, indicating that under an inflation
targeting framework a central bank has less (greater) control over exchange rate movements
in the presence of greater (limited) capital openness.
For future research, one interesting extension would involve examining the effect of a
time-varying inflation target on the model instead of assuming a constant inflation target.
Such an extension will help to incorporate developing countries into the empirical analysis.
Finally, it is worth noting that this paper allows for incomplete exchange rate pass-through
to inflation. Some of the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass-through on mone-
tary policy associated with the local currency pricing (Devereux and Engel (2002), Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003)) and the deviation from the law
of one price (Monacelli (2005)) have already been analyzed. At the same time, from the
empirical study in this paper (section 3.1), it is evident that monetary policy also affects
the level of exchange rate pass-through by anchoring inflation expectations more solidly
with greater openness of the capital market. Therefore, it would be interesting to fur-
ther explore the implications of alternative monetary policies on ERPT in the presence of
capital market imperfections.
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